Nationalism as a Factor in Legislation Restricting Foreign Investment:  Extractive Industries in Mexico by Zinman, Ira B.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 45 | Issue 4 Article 7
Summer 1970
Nationalism as a Factor in Legislation Restricting
Foreign Investment: Extractive Industries in
Mexico
Ira B. Zinman
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the
Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zinman, Ira B. (1970) "Nationalism as a Factor in Legislation Restricting Foreign Investment: Extractive Industries in Mexico,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 45 : Iss. 4 , Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol45/iss4/7
*NATIONALISM AS A FACTOR IN LEGISLATION RESTRICTING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN MEXICO
In response to the continued growth of international business invest-
ment many nations have established legal barriers which limit the scope
of foreign operations within their jurisdiction.' While it has been
suggested that the laws governing foreign capital are a reflection of unique
factors in each nation's development' there is one force, nationalism, which
to some degree always plays a role in influencing the passage of legislation
operating as a legal constraint upon foreign enterprise. The use of such
restrictive legislation requires that each nation balance the need for out-
side capital and technology to stimulate domestic economic development
against the placation of nationalistic pressures. These pressures are most
acutely expressed whenever nations hosting significant amounts of foreign
capital in extractive industries feel the need to protect scarce natural
resources from exploitation.
This paper provides an historical analysis of Mexican mining legisla-
tion which, due to long involvement' with foreign investment in domestic
resources, has developed into a highly advanced system which accommo-
dates the need for economic growth with the nationalistic desire to prevent
exploitation by foreigners. Arguably, the evolutionary development ex-
perienced in the passage of successive Mexican mining laws is indicative
of the trial and error process facing other nations which only recently
have begun to design foreign investment codes.
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The relevant history begins with the dictatorial regime of Porfirio
Diaz. In 1884, the Diaz government revised mineral legislation by
passing the Code of Mining which provided that surface salt deposits,
salt and fresh water, surface and underground petroleum, gas wells, and
springs of hot and medicinal waters would be the exclusive property of the
* Nationalism as used in this study must be understood as the claim for control of a
country's resources principally by its nationals.
1. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEa.IS 74 (1968).
2. "It is difficult to state why any particular nation passes such legislation, for the
manner in which foreign enterprise is treated under the laws of any given country dis-
closes a good deal about the economic, political, and historical development of that
country." Batiza, Current Attitudes on Me.rico's Treatment of the Foreign Enterprise, 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 365 (1963).
3. Mexico's relations with "outsiders" in this area began in 1559 when the King of
Spain declared royal ownership of gold, silver, and mercury mines. See Barker, Mexican
Mining Concessions, 5 So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1931).
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surface owner.' The new law, like many Diaz programs, was intended
to attract foreign investment by easing the way for the exploitation of
surface and subsoil minerals.5 After 1884 the influx of foreign capital
steadily increased.' According to available estimates about two-thirds of
the nation's total investment, exclusive of agriculture and handicrafts,
came from foreigners.' Capital investment from the United States, for
example, grew from 200 million dollars in 1897 to 1,100 million dollars
in 1911, while French investment increased from 100 million dollars in
1902 to about 400 million dollars in 1911, and British investment expanded
from 164 million dollars in 1880 to over 300 million dollars in 1911.8
The feeling in *Mexico was that foreign capital began extensively to
dominate the economic life of the people. At this time "the history of
Mexican economic development [was seen as] a long, often sordid,
story of exploitation. . . ."' The exploitation of labor, the "crude, coarse
arrogance of the North Americans, the utter disdain in which they held
their Mexican colleagues and co-workers, and their persistent refusal to
absorb even in the smallest way, a part of Mexican culture" were all
resented."0 In addition while commerce fared well Mexico's poor which
constituted almost ninety per cent of the population saw itself as "sinking
into a condition of poverty and wretchedness.""
The ensuing revolution of 1910 was characterized by a growing
spirit of nationalism and an antagonism for foreign interests whose
success had been contemporaneous with a decline in the economic welfare
of the peasant class.' Diaz's policies "overlooked too many of the social
and political aspirations of the middle and lower classes to endure when
confronted by popular revolution."' 3 It was resentment of the environ-
ment created by the foreign entrepreneur which figured strongly in
national revolutionary slogans such as "Mexico for Mexicans." The
4. Black, Ownership of the Minerals Underlying the Bancos Along the Rio Grande,
37 TEX. L. REV. 52 (1958).
5. M. BERNSTEIN, THE MEXICAN MINING INDUSTRY 1890-1950, at 18 (1964).
6. R. VERNON, THE DILEMMA OF MEXICO'S DEVELOPMENT 42-43 (1963).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Note, Foreign Investment in Mexico: The Emergency Decree of 1944, 39 TUL.
L. REV. 539 (1965).
10. See, J. MADDOX, POINT IV ON MEXICO 4 (1957).
11. F. DUNN, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF AMERICANS IN MEXICO 307 (1933).
For a more detailed description of Mexican attitudes toward foreign investment in ex-
tractive industries, see, R. VERNON, How LATIN AMERICA VIEWs THE U.S. INVESTOR 95-
117 (1966) and H. CLINE THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 183 (1953).
12. See F. DUNN, supra note 11, at 309.
13. Bradenburg, A Contribution to the Theory of Entrepreneur and Economic De-
velopment: The Case of Mexico, 7 INTERAMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Vol. XVI, No. 3
(1963).
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Constitution of 1917 was undoubtedly a most significant outcome of the
1910 revolution and the following years of strife. The new Constitution
proclaimed an "intense economic nationalism and the social responsibility
of private property to the welfare of the country."1 Within the 1917
Constitution article 27 is the most important and basic provision concern-
ing foreign mineral investment :11
There is vested in the Nation the direct ownership of the
natural resources . . . all minerals or substances . . .such as
minerals from which are extracted metals and metalloids utilized
in industry; the deposits of precious stones, rock salt, and the
saline deposits formed directly by marine waters; products
derived from the decomposition of rocks when their exploitation
requires underground work; . . . and all space over national
territory, in the extent and terms which may be fixed by
International Law.
In the cases referred to ... the ownership by the Nation
is inalienable and imprescriptible; and the exploitation . . .
by individuals, or organizations constituted in accordance with
Mexican laws, may be realized only by means of concessions
granted by the federal executive branch, in conformity with
rules and conditions which the laws may establish.
Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican
companies may acquire ownership of land, water and their
appurtenances, or obtain licenses to exploit mines or waters.
The state may grant such right to aliens, provided they agree
before the Secretariat of Foreign Relations to be considered
with regard to these assets as nationals and not to invoke the
protection of their governments in matters related to such assets,
under penalty of forfeiting in favor of the Nation assets
acquired thereby if they breach the agreement....
The Mexican government intended article 27 to clearly assert Mexican
control over land and foreign investment in natural resources. The
special importance of this article is that it has been the impetus for later
political and legislative policy.
Mining legislation implementing article 27 was not passed until
1926.16 The Law of Mineral Industries reaffirmed the pronouncements
of the 1917 Constitution by declaring direct ownership of all minerals
14. Hevbel, The Political Aspects of Doing Business in Mexico, DOING BUSINESS IN
MExico 7 (1967).
15. MEX. CONsT. art. 27, as amended, D.O., Jan. 20, 1960.
16. Law of Mineral Industries, D.O., May 3, 1926.
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in the soil and subsoil by the nation (art. 2). The 1926 law created four
types of mining concessions and one concession for processing plants
(chapters IV, V, VII). Concessions were given limited life spans. Explor-
atory concessions had a maximum life of five years (art. 57) while a con-
cession for exploitation was valid for thirty years with a possibility of
renewal (art. 36). Under the 1926 law, there was no 'surface tax on
concessions. Although the law was the first significant attempt to imple-
ment article 27, it was strongly criticized on the ground that it did not
meet the needs of an expanding mining industry." As a result it was
specifically repealed in 1930.
The Mining Law of 193018 encouraged future industrial growth in
which more domestic control over natural resources was to be emphasized.
The 1930 legislation provided for the continued use of two types of
ordinary mining concessions; one for exploration and the other for
exploitation. The exploration concession had a limited life of two years and
only one such concession could be held at a time (arts. 20, 24). Con-
cessions for exploitation, on the other hand, could be issued without limit
to any single party and were perpetual so long as the concessionaire paid
the surface tax and met the other requirements of the act (art. 25).
Mexicans or Mexican companies could acquire either concession. For-
eigners as well could obtain concessions by compliance with article 27 of
the Constitution and some additional formalities (art. 6) Despite the
progressive nature of the Mining Law of 1930"' it was entirely repealed
by the New Mining Law of 1961. The abrogation of the 1930 law, it
has been suggested,2" was not due to any failure to meet the needs of the
mining industry, but was a result of radical changes in government policy
caused by a desire to meet the political objectives of "Mexicanization."
Whereas the 1930 legislation was concerned only with development of the
mineral industry itself, later events created a situation in which emphasis
was placed on defining the industry's role in terms of a national policy
aimed at the social and economic betterment of the Mexican people.2'
President Lizaro Cirdens cbntemporaneously with his election in
1935 announced policies2 which stimulated a new wave of Mexican
17. Verity, Mineral Law of Mexico, 2 Am. L. OF MINING 785 (1969).
18. Mining Law of 1930, D.O., Aug. 7, 1930.
19. Miranda, Legal and Economic Aspects of Foreign Investments in Mexico, 2S
TEX B.J. 865 (1962).
20. See VERITY, supra note 17, at 788.
21. See M. WioNczEc, EL NACIONALISM0 Y LA INVERSl N EXTRANJERA (1967).
The author states that the passage of the new law was "but a logical extension of a new
strategy of economic development in which the policy of exploitation of natural resources
ought to play a different role than it has been assigned in the past." Id. at 241.
22. These policies were in conformity with an attitude of reform previously ex-
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nationalism. The new President declared that outside capital in Mexican
resources should be prepared to reinvest profits and aid in Mexican
social and economic development.23 New policies were initiated to benefit
Mexican labor and to discriminate against foreign employees, especially
the managerial class. "Xenophobia became part of Mexican thought, and
anti-foreign actions were hailed as a crusade against modern con-
quistadores."24 Organized Mexican labor bargained for better health
standards, conditions and wages.2" In response to the stubborn refusal of
some foreign firms to negotiate terms, as well as to fears of dominance
by foreign capital, President Cfrdenas began unprecedented expropriation
of oil and railroad properties in 1938.26 To the common people Cfirdenas
was a hero. "After 1938 the whole internal spirit of Mexico changed. The
latent inferiority complex so widespread among Mexicans gave way to
satisfaction and pride."27 By the end of the 1930's the government had
begun to create a role for the public sector in advancing Mexican economic
growth. Government policy would constitute a check on exploitation by
foreign capital and assure that Mexican interests shared in the economic
benefits derived from domestic natural resources.2
World War II created conditions which required Mexico to pass
important legislation concerning the activities of aliens. The Suspension of
Guarantees Decree,29 issued on June 1, 1942, gave the President wide
power to deal with situations which would arise as a result of the war.
Pursuant to that decree the Emergency Decree of 19440 was issued. The
preamble stated that absent regulation, increased foreign funds would be
put into investments of a transient nature that would neither give due
consideration to Mexican participation nor to Mexican economic develop-
ment and stability. In order to prevent political chaos and economic depres-
sion, and to channel excess capital into more stable investments the
pressed by Cfrdenas' predecessors. Presidents Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-28), Emilio
Portes Gil (1928-30), and Abelardo L. Rodriguez (1930-34).
23. See Wall St. J., April 1, 1970, p. 1, col. 1. H. CLINE, THE UNITED STATES AND
MEXICO 238 (1953). Current Mexican presidential candidate Luis Echeverria Alvarez,
as evidence of the current vitality of this policy, is quoted as saying that foreign invest-
ments "will be welcome as long as they are complementary to national capital. National
capital ought to be developed. But this is not sufficient. We need a complementary
contribution of foreign capital that will have all kinds of guarantees on the condition that
it contributes to healthy economic national development."
24. See H. CLINE, supra note 23, at 238.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Public utilities also came under government regulation, see, Wionczek, Electric
Power: The Uneasy Partnership, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO
107 (R. Vernon ed. 1964).
29. Decree of June 1, 1942, D.O., June 2, 1942.
30. Decree of June 6, 1944, D.O., June 7, 1944.
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Emergency Decree provided several stipualtions. Foreign investors and
'Mexican companies with foreign participating ownership were required to
receive permission from the Secretary of Foreign Relations before buying,
controlling, or acquiring the majority of stock in any compay engaged in
industry, mining, agriculture, cattle, timber, purchase and exploitation of
either agricultural or urban land, including the subdivision or urbanization
of such land." The Secretary's authorization would also be required when
foreign interests sought concessions in mines, waters and mineral fuels. 2
His permission was also needed to modify the charter or the capital
structure of any company having foreign participation.3 The Secretary
of Foreign Relations was granted the power to impose conditions on his
authorization, 4 such as requiring Mexican companies having alien share-
holders to show, in an easily verifiable manner, that at least fifty-one per
cent of the equity was held by Mexicians.35 This particular stipulation
is important and is often referred to as the "Mexicanization" provision.
When the war ended all constitutional rights were re-established by
decree passed by the Mexican Congress on September 28, 1945.6
Statutes of temporary character issued to combat the war's effect on the
nation were to be abrogated. Article 6 of the post war decree stated,
however, that laws which authorized the Republic to intervene in the
economic life of the country were not to be abrogated. The Secretary of
Foreign Relations continued to enforce the Emergency Decree of 1944
on the authority of article 6. This contradiction between article 6 and the
policy of the post war decree caused much confusion in Mexico and abroad
concerning the extent of the Secretary's powers." Taking note of the
confusion the post war administration apparently wished to formulate a
clear statement of policy on foreign investment. An Intersecretariat
Commission was formed to study and coordinate legal provisions ap-
plicable to foreign investment. The results of the Commission's study do
not appear to have been of significant value. 9 A major reason for this
31. Id. § 1 (last paragraph).
32. Id.
33. Id. §2.
34. Id. § 3.
35. Id. § 3(111) (a) & (b).
36. Decree of Sept. 28, 1945, D.O., Dec. 28, 1945.
37. Id. § 5.
38. Suit was brought in the case of Quimica Industrial de Monterey, S.A., Suprema
Corte de Justicia de Mexico (Segunda Sala), Sept. 20, 1962, 66 SEmENARIO JUDIcIAL:
Sexta Epoca 25 (1963) to decide the question of the extent of the Secretary's powers.
The question, however, was not laid to rest because in Mexico binding precedent is not
established until the cases have been decided in the same way by the high court. See Note,
Foreign Investment in Mexico: The Emergency Decree of 1944, 39 TuL. L. REv. 539
(1965).
39. See 39 TUL. L. REv., supra note 38, at 556.
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failure was the reluctance of President Miguel Alemdn's (1946-52)
subsequent administration to issue a policy statement enforcing the
potentially powerful Decree of 1944. In fact, after assuming office,
President Alemdn stated that the "Mexicanization" provision limiting
foreign capital to forty-nine per cent ownership in the listed industries40
was only a device to be used by the Secretary of Foreign Relations in
exceptional cases. This limitation of the Secretary's power under the
"Mexicanization" clause indicated a liberal government policy toward
foreign investment and was responsive to Mexico's need to bolster the
domestic economy by attracting outside capital.
The post World War II period, under President Alemn's govern-
ment, although dampened by monetary problems and devaluation, was
characterized by continued public and private investment. Yet while
industry and commerce continued to grow, the largely foreign-owned4
mining sector lagged behind except for a short period during the
Korean War.4 Prices fell after the Korean War and the industry suffered
from labor problems, increased transportation costs and especially high
taxes. Although mining accounted for only about four per cent of the
gross national product its share of taxes amounted to between ten and
fifteen per cent of federal income.43 In addition to an income tax there was
a dividend tax, an excess profits tax, import duties and a production
tax.4 If investment and growth in the mining industry were to be
realistic economic goals reformation of the burdening tax structure was
a necessity.
The opportunities for investment in the mining industry became
even less appealing over the next ten years. President Adolfo Ruiz
Cortines (1952-58), President Aleman's successor, faced with a post-
Korean war slump and a worsening balance of payments, brought in a
more conservative attitude of restraint on public spending and fiscal
policy.4" Foreign investment continued to grow in spite of mixed feelings
among Mexicans about its presene." These negative attitudes were
40. This list included: radio stations, movies, transportation, fisheries and fish cul-
ture, canning, publishing, advertising soft drinks, bottling of fruit juices, rubber products,
basic chemical products, petroleum derivates, fertilizers, insecticides, agriculture and min-
ing.
41. Navarro, Una Politica Minera Mexicana, 20 INVESTIGACION ECONO,ICA 835,
837-42 (1960).
42. See note 5 supra, at 236.
43. Bogert, Mexicanization: Its Impact on the Mining Industry of Mexico, 25 MIx-
ING WORLD 12-15, No. 3 (1963).
44. Gumpel & Margin, Taxation in Mexico (WORLD TAX SERIES 1957).
45. A. BOHRIscH, LA POLITICA MEXICANA SOBRE INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS 108
(1968).
46. Id. at 110.
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primarily a result of the adverse pressure foreign assembly plants brought
to bear upon the country's balance of payments. During the Cortines
administration Mexico's large business groups began to align themselves
against foreign investment. Many factors contributed to this change in
Mexican attitudes, but basically foreign investment bore the blame for a
drop in living standards and heightened public concern over economic
problems." The most fervant anti-foreign group was the National Cham-
ber of Industry in Transformation (CNIT). The CNIT organization
worked hard to influence Mexico's ruling political party which had in the
past heeded advice from business groups.48 In 1953, at its second con-
gress, CNIT lashed out against foreign private investment and initiated
an energetic campaign against those Mexicans who favored foreign
capital.
From the beginning of the Mateos administration in 1958 until
1961 a combination of events created even more of a damper on foreign
and domestic investor spirit. In the last days of the Cortines administra-
tion the government in collaboration with the incoming Mateos adminis-
tration amended article 27 of the Constitution to confer upon Petroleos
Mexicanos, a government-owned company, the exclusive rights to
establish and direct the petro-chemical industry. The exclusion of foreign
capital in this industry caused the voidng of consternation in publications
sympathetic to foreign interests.4" Such governmental limitation of out-
side investment, especially from American sources, was further stimulated
by political upheaval over the Cuban situation. After Castro's expropria-
tion of American commerical properties, Washington put pressure on
the Mexican government to help isolate Cuba politically and economically.
This American pressure created tensions in Mexico which caused a schism
between the political forces of the left and the right."0 General Mexican
support for the leftists, who sympathized with Cuba, was reflected in the
administration's position, Mateos announced that the government's policy
was to be "on the extreme left within the Constitution."'" In order to
further appease political and nationalist groups the government hastened
secret negotiations for the purchase of all foreign-owned electrical utilities.
47. See note 13 supra, at 41.
48. See note 6 sup ra, at 131, 189.
49. See note 21 supra, at 238. This amendment to the Constitution discussed here
was published in the D.O. on Jan. 20, 1960, just less than one year before the decree giv-
ing exclusive rights to the state to conduct, transform, distribute and supply electric
power used for public service; published in D.O., Dec. 29, 1960. These two amendments
and other events, coming so close together caused much concern among investors as
will be seen in later discussion.
50. See note 21 supra, at 242.
51. See note 6 supra, at 135.
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By September, 1960 all electrical companies, apparently eager to sell out,52
were nationalized. This purchase brought a favorable, almost frenzied,
reaction from the entire spectrum of Mexican political groups.5" The
threat of Mexico becoming a socialist state alarmed those who had
capital invested there.
Although response to Mateos' nationalization policy was evidence of
wide anti-foreign sentiment it was not nearly as disparaging to foreign
and conservative Mexican investors and the passage of the New Mining
Law of 1961."' Given the political tone of the late fifties and 1960, and
the shift in attitudes of business organizations against foreign capital, the
passage of the new law was inappropriately timed for meeting the needs
of the mining industry. While the mining industry, long burdened by a
heavy taxation policy, required fiscal reforms to encourage investor
participation, the 1961 act represents a nationalistic declaration of in-
dependence from the foreign manner of operation in Mexico. Its preamble
suggests the stance taken by the act :
This continued oppressive domination of mining activity and
refining by foreign interest represents an anomaly in a nation
that has affirmed its dominion over the subsoil. The measure,
taken in 1961, in spite of the fact that it respects interests
now established, exercises pressure in order to give Mexicans
the majority interest in the foreign mining companies, limiting
the exploratory concessions and the tariffs of those so con-
stituted.
Foreign capital was still obstensibly welcome in Mexico, but only in
accord with the policy of economic development first enunciated in
the Constitution of 1917. Investor response to the 1961 enactment was
immediate. Between 1961 and 1962 about 200 million dollars in private
capital left the country.56 Investor reactions had heavy negative overtones
with accusations of "nationalization," "more government control" and
"delayed expropriation."57
The 1961 law is meant to encourage Mexican participation in the
mining industry. Toward this end, it changes the 1930 enactment by
redefining who may own mineral concessions. Under the 1961 law
52. See note 28 supra, at 93.
53. Id. at 92.
54. New Mining Law of 1961, D.O., Feb. 7, 1961.
55. Author's literal translation from the Spanish.
56. See note 21 supra, at 271.
57. See, Mexico Tightens Grip on U.S. Companies, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 4, 1961,
and Bogert, Mexicanization: Its Impact on the Mining Industry of Mexico, 25 MINING
WORLD, no. 3, p. 14 (1963).
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exploitation and utilization of mineral resources may be carried out by
(1) the state, through public mining entities (art. 17) ;58 (2) companies
with state participation (art. 5) ;5 (3) private persons either natural or
juridic. Within the third category a significant change from prior
legislation pertains to participation of foreigners in mining operations.
The new law stipulates that concessions may only be obtained by
Mexicans or Mexican companies in which a majority of the capital is
subscribed by Mexicans (art. 14). Foreign governments and sovereigns
may not under any circumstances acquire concessions or mining rights
of any kind, nor may they be partners, associates, or stockholders of
mining enterprises (art. 14). Concessions under the new law have a life
of twenty-five years yet may be extended upon application (art. 29,
reg. 116). Titles issued under prior legislation continue in force, but are
limited in life to twenty-five years and may be renewed only in accordance
with the provisions of the new law (transitory art. 3).
Earlier discussion of the problems of achieving growth in the mining
industry focused upon the government's tax policy. The taxes on mining
had, it has been suggested,"0 represented the most serious obstacle to the
development of this important industry. In attempting to resolve this
situation the new law offered tax incentives to foreign firms that would
"Mexicanize" by adopting the provisions of the 1961 enactment. Articles
52 and 56 of the Law of Taxes and Promotion of the Mining Industries6
were amended to allow a fifty per cent reduction in federal production and
export taxes for Mexicanized firms. Despite the fact that to receive this
reduction it was necessary to pay the entire tax and then apply for a
rebate, 2 reduced taxes 3 in these two areas could have been of significant
58. The ability of the state to participate in mining operations was not~a part of
the 1930 mineral legislation. Establishment of a public mining entity requires congres-
sional enactment proposed by the Federal Executive. Law of Feb. 6, 1961, Mining Law
of 1961, [1961] D.O. 1.
59. Mining companies with state participation are established whenever the Federal
Executive feels their creation is desirable for the development of the mining industry.
Such companies have variable capital with Series A, B and C Certificates. Series A is
nontransferable and 51 per cent must be subscribed by the federal government. Series B
may be owned by Mexicans or Mexican companies whose capital is at least 66 per cent
owned by Mexicans. Series C may be subscribed by anyone except sovereigns and gov-
ernments. Law of February 6, 1961, Mining Law of 1961, [1961] D.O. 1.
60. See the paper in regard to mining taxes presented by the Mining Chamber of
Mexico to the Fourth National Congress of Industrialists in March 1957, published in
Spanish and English.
61. Decree to Amend articles 52 and 56 of the Law on Taxes and promotion of
the Mining Industry, D.O., Feb. 6, 1961.
62. Id.
63. Companies qualifying for the fifty per cent reduction would then be entitled to
further negotiate with the Minister of Finance for greater decreases in production and
export taxes were they required in certain instances.
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value to mining companies. The significance of the export and production
taxes in terms of cost to the mining industry in clear. Export taxes create
the heaviest burden on the industry since the greater part of all metals
and minerals mined except for coal, iron, copper and petroleum is
exported." Production taxes are levied on all metals and minerals. A
value is established for each product depending on whether it is refined
metal, impure bars, precipitate, concentrates or crude ore (art. 13).
The production tax rate scale varies from 0.34 per cent to 20.6 per cent
of the assigned value."1 Together export and production taxes amount to
approximately one-third of the gross revenue received for nearly all
metals and minerals exported.66
The expected encouragement for "Mexicanization" of the mining
industry, due to the lessening of the tax burden, did not occur. Mexican
investors, to begin with, were skeptical about investing in the mining
industry where they could only hope for about a seven per cent rate of
return whereas less risky ventures were available with expected returns of
up to fifteen per cent.67 Foreign groups were also reluctant to invest
funds in risky mining ventures while holding a less than majority forty-
nine per cent capital interest. The mining industry itself was faltering
badly because of low prices for principal metals in the international
markets and the high cost of operation. Companies were ceasing opera-
tions and tonnage production was dropping to the lowest levels in
fifteen years.66 No less discouraging was the fact that nearly three years
after the effective date of the law allowing the reductions, administrative
barriers had prevented all Mexican or Mexicanized companies from
receiving the tax rebate.69
In response to the industry's problems the government announced,
in 1963, plans to give it increased subsidies and more tax benefits."
The tax structure was made more attractive in the hope of increasing
foreign investment in the industry. It further initiated a program to
facilitate the "Mexicanization" of firms to enable them to receive the tax
benefits under the new law. Under a plan established by the Ministry of
Treasury, foreign firms that were unable to find Mexican buyers for their
64. See note 17 supra, at 834.11.
65. Id. at 834.13.
66. See Panencia Central Sobre la Industria Minera, METALURGICA 9. Presented by
the National Mining Chamber to the Consejo de Planeacion Economica Y Social in the
Federal District, June 11, 1958. This percentage remained approximately the same in
1962. See note 17 supra, at 834.11.
67. See THE ECONOMlIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT LIMITED ON MEXICO at 10 (Sept.
1963) and COMERCIO EXTERIOR at 198-99 (April 1962).
68. CAMAARA MINERA DE MEXICO, XXVI Assembly at 4, 5, 6, 21, 22 (1963).
69. See note 17 supra, at 834.12.
70. Fiscal Stimulants to the Mining Industry, D.O., May 22, 1963.
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stock could apply to the Minister of Finance to put fifty-one per cent of
their capital shares into an irrevocable trust."1 The stock was then to be
made available for sale to Mexicans at a price previously negotiated
between the government and the foreign company. 2 Upon completion of
the trust contract the firm was immediately entitled to apply for the
fifty per cent tax reductions. 3
In spite of these extensive governmental efforts to help the industry,
by fiscal measures and the trust plan, capitalists did not react favorably.
Some investors felt that not enough was being done to stimulate develop-
ment,71 while others felt that the state was interfering too much in the
private sector.75 Thus in many respects the New Mining Law of 1961
failed to stimulate the mining industry. It failed to attract Mexican invest-
ment with foreign participation because it created administrative road
blocks to quick receipt of tax rebates and misunderstandings as to the
government's economic goals.7" The attempt to create an economy of
public control over private investment seemingly lacked a basic plan
and thus led to great uncertainty."7 It may have been possible to eliminate
some of the uncertainty created by the new law had the parties better
understood each others goals and aspirations.
For the purposes of perceiving nationalism's role in influencing
restrictive legislation the following statement by Jose Campillo, former
president of the Mexican Mining Chamber, should put the concept of
a "nationalism"78 in its proper context.
The purpose of Mexicanization that the law pursues is a
consequence of the economic belief of our country that its
nationals ought to extensively participate in the profitable use
of their own resources. . . I think also that the intervention
of Mexican capital will serve to lessen tensions and critical
attitudes in our industry . . . and will result in greater con-
venience and stability to outside investments that desire to
unite in a cooperative effort with local capital to give.stimulus
to the economic progress of our nation.
71. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 28; Aug. 19, 1963, p. 10.
72. Trust Regulations art. 4 D.O., July 20, 1963. After the eighth year of ex-
istence of the trust, the Secretary of Finance or the entrustors may request adjustments
in the sale price of the shares.
73. Id. art. 9.
74. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, Aug. 26, 1963, at 28.
75. See note 43 supra, at 15.
76. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT ON MEXICO at 3 (Nov. 1966) and CAMARA
MINERA DE MEXICO, XXXI Assembly at 3 (1968).
77. See note 13 supra, at 3 and ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE ON MEXICO at 11 (May
1966).
78. CAMARA MINERA DE MEXICO, XXIV Assembly at 3 (1961).
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These goals of the Mexican government expressed in the 1961 enactment
were actually an extension of objectives established in the Constitution
of 1917. They represent an attempt to encourage foreign investment in
a profitable cooperative venture through which domestic economic growth
can be achieved. The private entrepreneur, however, may have been misled
because each presidential administration seemed to give its own inter-
pretation to the enforcement of national policies expressed in the 1917
Constitution. The government could have eased uncertainties surrounding
the passage of the New Mining Law of 1961 by better analyzing investor
psychology at the time and thereby realizing that misapprehension
existed. To achieve greater understanding between the parties the ad-
ministration could have then proceeded by first clearly defining its
objectives to the investing public. As the situation evolved, however,
investors generally felt that the attitude of certain officials was dis-
couraging and that the regulations of the 1961 law were too restrictive. 9
Economic growth through increased investment in mining surely could
not have resulted under these circumstances.
In spite of the fact that the government's intentions were unclear,
investors could have predicted the inevitability of restraint upon foreign
investment activity. The increasing nationalistic spirit evident in the late
nineteen fifties and 1960 should have forewarned the foreign investor
that his position was fast losing stability in Mexico and a new restrictive
law to regulate the mining industry should not have come as a great
surprise. By being more attentive to the pressure put upon the govern-
ment by Mexican business and political groups the private investor should
have foreseen the forthcoming legislative changes.
The new administration of President Gustavo Diaz Orddz (1964-
70) immediately began to work towards creating a more attractive market
for investors. To achieve this end new regulations governing the 1961
law were passed repealing those of 1962.80 An important modification
adopted by the new program effected the export and production tax
reduction. Prior to the change the tax was paid first and a fifty per cent
rebate as returned upon application. Under the new fiscal measure there
was an automatic fifty per cent reduction in export and production taxes
in minerals, metals and metallic compounds originating in Mexican or
Mexicanized firms.8" Large amounts of tax revenue, the refund of which
were previously subject to wide administrative discretion,82 were thus
79. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERAL YEARBOOK 1965, AREA REPORTS: INTER-
NATIONAL, MINERAL INDUSTRY IN MEXICO 1 (1965).
80. Regulations of New Mining Law of 1961, D.O., Dec. 7, 1966, at 1.
81. Id. at 3.
82. Id.
NATIONALISM AS A FACTOR
free from deposit with the govertment. Mexico witnessed a long crisis
in its prime mining industry before arriving at much-needed reforms.
Since that time the government's attitude has been quite favorable toward
foreign investors and new guidelines are more clearly expressed to the
public. "
CONCLUSION
As a consequence of a series of historical events Mexico has achieved
a high level of sophistication in its legal attitudes towards foreign
capitalists. The Revolution of 1910 was the first major expression of
nationalism. The Constitution of 1917 reaffirmed the nation's intention
to control the subsoil wealth for the benefit of the Mexican people. Later
presidential administrations repeatedly expressd the need for Mexican
participation "in the profitable use of their own resources.. . ." Heightened
periods of nationalistic tension reoccurred when domestic economic growth
slowed and when the nation's balance of payments worsened. Nationalistic
groups like CNIT seemed to be active almost constantly in denouncing
the foreigner. The government turned, however, from the harsh means
of controlling outside capital by expropriation in 1938 to more sophisticat-
ed legal and administrative restraints and guidelines.
Countries that host significant amounts of international capital in
crucial natibnal resources are likely to experience similar periods of
evolutionary development as did Mexico. For example, the recent Peruvian
expropriation of foreign-owned oil properties might be viewed as similar
to the Mexican expropriation of 1938; foreign investors, seeing the tide of
nationalistic sentiment swept in with Peru's new government, might have
been forewarned of events which followed. Whether Peru will turn to
less drastic measures in the future is a question for time to answer.84
Not all nations will react alike to foreign investment but legal
restraints are certainly a likely course. Although any single piece of
legislation is caused by complex historical and contemporary elements, a
recognition of the role of nationalism as a countervailing factor in deter-
mining the ultimate character of investment restraints can aid foreign in-
83. CAMARA MINERA DE MEXICO, XXXI Assembly at 5 (1968) and SEIII-MONTHLY
DIGEST OF THE MEXICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S., INC. at 1 (Aug. 1, 1969).
84. For an example of legislation in use by several African nations respective to
foreign investment see Mitchell, Foreign Investment Legislation in Africa, FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT QUARTERLY, No. 1, 1970, at 7. Under most of these investment codes,
negotiations between the foreign investor and the nation are ad hoc and investment pro-
visions are often subject to much administrative discretion. As administrations change
officials may feel the need to treat foreign investors differently depending upon economic
development needs versus the need to achieve nationalistic goals.
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vestors and their advisors in understanding and evaluating what will
likely be the environment abroad in the future.
IRA B. ZINMAN
